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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL DUTY: 
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY. By Philip Hamburger.] 
Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. xviii + 658. $49.95. 
Nelson Lund2 
What we call "judicial review·· was not established in 
Marbury v. Madison, or by American courts. It had existed in 
English and then American law for centuries, not as some kind 
of peculiar power but rather as a corollary of the judicial duty to 
decide cases according to the law of the land. While that duty 
sometimes required judicial courage in the face of political 
threats. this was not its most difficult or pervasive demand. The 
real challenge was the requirement that judges purge their 
decision-making of the influence of their own wills, which 
required them to set aside their own views about natural law, 
God's will, sound policy. and even justice itself. 
Phillip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Dllty advances and 
defends these claims with subtlety and detailed evidence. He 
carries his historical study up through the end of the eighteenth 
century, and thus has little to say about subsequent changes in 
the understanding of judicial review and judicial duty. But there 
are obvious implications for our contemporary debates about the 
proper role of judges and about the distinction between law and 
politics. This review touches on those debates, and suggests that 
a broadened political role for the federal judiciary may have 
been more clearly foreseeable than the leading proponents of 
our Constitution thought it wise to acknowledge during the 
ratification debates. 
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George Mason University School of Law. For helpful comments. I am grateful to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In what has become a familiar ritual, Sonia Sotomayor 
presented herself for Senate confirmation as a judge who has 
never done anything except apply the law to the facts. and never 
will do anything else. Notwithstanding many speeches and law 
review articles in which she had articulated a rather different 
account of what judges do,3 she resolutely maintained this 
position throughout her confirmation hearings. 
Sotomayor's hearings. however. were not quite a repeat of 
the usual kabuki. For one thing, she had been nominated by a 
former law professor, who had said that he was not looking for 
judges who fit Sotomayor's description of herself because such 
judges cannot exist. In explaining his vote against confirming 
John Roberts as Chief Justice. then-Senator Obama said: 
[W]hile adherence to legal precedent and rules of statutory or 
constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent of the 
cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a 
Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most of the time on 
those 95 percent of the cases-what matters on the Supreme 
Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult. In 
those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of construction 
and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of 
the marathon. That last mile can only be determined on the 
basis of one's deepest values. one's core concerns, one's 
broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth 
and breadth of one's empathy .... [I]n those difficult cases. 
the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge's 
heart.4 
When asked about Obama 's statement at her confirmation 
hearings, nominee Sotomayor promptly and unequivocally 
repudiated _the views of the President by whom she had been 
nominated.' 
3. Most famouslv: 
Justice O'Connor -has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise 
old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases. I am not so sure ... 
that I agree with the statement. First. as Professor Martha Minnow has noted. 
there can never be a universal definition of wise. Second. I would hope that a 
wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than 
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life. 
Sonia Sotomayor. A Latina Judge's v'oice. 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87. 92 (2002). 
4. Senator Barack Obama. Confirmation of Judge John Roberts (Sept. 22. 2005). 
m·ailable at http:/ /obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation -of-Judge-John-Roberts-Obama-
Speech.htm. 
5. Sotomamr Confirmation Hearings, Day 2. N.Y. TIMES. Jul. 14. 2009. available at 
http://www .nyti~es.com/2009/07 I 14/us/politics/ 1..\confirm-text.html. 
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Sotomayor's repeated. emphatic. and uncompromising 
insistence that the law alone always dictates her judicial 
decisions provoked Georgetown law professor Louis Michael 
Seidman to say what many other sophisticated legal observers 
must have been thinking: 
I was completely disgusted by Judge Sotomayor's testimony 
today. If she was not perjuring herself, she is intellectually 
unqualified to be on the Supreme Court. If she was perjuring 
herself, she is morally unqualified .... First year law students 
understand within a month that many areas of the law are 
open textured and indeterminate- that the legal material 
frequently (actually. I would say always) must be 
supplemented by contestable presuppositions, empirical 
assumptions, and moral judgments .... 
Perhaps Justice [sic) Sotomayor should be excused because 
our official ideology about judging is so degraded that she 
would sacrifice a position on the Supreme Court if she told 
the truth. Legal academics who defend what she did toda>' 
have no such excuse. They should be ashamed of themselves. 
Observers even more sophisticated than Professor Seidman 
may have agreed that Sotomayor was lying, without sharing his 
outrage. After all. don't all the Justices, to one degree or 
another, tell the same sort of lies in their judicial opinions? If law 
is just politics by another means, the only lies worth condemning 
are those told by your political opponents. Why should anyone 
be ashamed of this, whether they are judges, nominees, or legal 
academics? Leaving aside Professor Seidman's indignation, 
obviously genuine and in that respect perhaps a bit unusual,7 it 
would probably be hard to find a knowledgeable observer today 
who does not at least privately believe that all of our Supreme 
Court Justices frequently and inevitably make decisions based 
I don't-wouldn't approach the issue of judging in the way the president does. 
He has to explain what he meant by judging. I can only explain what I think 
judges should do. which is judges can't rely on what's in their heart. They don't 
determine the law. Congress makes the laws. The job of a judge is to apply the 
law. And so 1t"s not the heart that compels conclusions in cases. it's the law. 
6. The Federalist Society Online Debate Series. July 13. 2009. http://www.fed-
soc.org/debates/dbtid.30/default.asp. 
7. Professor Seidman is an outspoken advocate of progressive judicial activism. 
See. e.g .. Louis Michael Seidman. Romer·s Radicalism: The Unexpected Reviml of 
Warren Court Activism. 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 67. His indignant attack on an Obama 
nominee who was once a leader of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 
could hardly have involved dissembling based on partisan or narrowly political 
motivations. 
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largely on their personal political and moral beliefs, whatever 
they may say about The Rule of Law. 
To the legal sophisticates who believe that ex-professor 
Obama was only stating what has obviously always been true, 
Philip Hamburger offers a fundamental challenge. 
II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
A fairly standard story about American judicial power goes 
something like this. The Constitution is silent about the 
authority of the Supreme Court to declare Acts of Congress 
unconstitutional. That power was seized by the Court in 
Marbury v. Madison, a seizure made especially impressive by 
Chief Justice Marshall's politically shrewd opinion.H He 
confounded President Jefferson by ruling in favor of his 
administration, even while also declaring that the administration 
had behaved illegally. Even better, by holding that Congress had 
unconstitutionally enacted a trivial expansion of the Court's 
power, Marshall achieved a radical assertion of the Court's 
enduring power over Congress.9 With these savvy maneuvers, 
Marbury laid the foundation for an independent and powerful 
judiciary, which has now become the undisputed final legal 
authority on the meaning of the Constitution. Our judges now 
perform the vital political function of shaping and reshaping 
constitutional law, sometimes to accord with the evolving needs 
and emerging moral vision of a diverse and dynamic nation, 
sometimes to resist spasms of undesirable innovation or 
backsliding produced by factional politics or democratic hysteria. 
Consistently with this story, generations of American law 
students have begun their study of constitutional law with 
Marbury. And much of what they read in the rest of the 
introductory course tends to confirm the stirring saga that begins 
R. The classic statement of this understanding is presented in ROBERT G. 
MCCLOSKEY. THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 23-28 (3d ed. 2000) (1st ed. 1960). 
McCloskey stated at the outset that his goal was to show the Court as "'an agency with a 
mind and~ will and an influence of its own .... (N)ot many sophisticated persons would 
now take these words of (John Marshall) very seriously: ·Judicial power. as 
contradistinguished from the power of the laws. has no existence. Courts are the mere 
instruments of the law. and can will nothing."' /d. at xv. 
9. The machiavellian interpretation of Marbury gains added credence from the 
fact that the Court was only able to find a constitutional violation after first adopting the 
most dubious interpretations of both the relevant constitutional provision and the 
statutory provision that was struck down. See DAVID P. CURRIE. THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME COCRT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 17R9-1888. at 67--69 (1985). 
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with this putatively seminal case. And no wonder-most of what 
they read has been written by John Marshall's heirs. 
This story should never have made much sense to anyone 
familiar with the history of the American founding. The 
argument for judicial review in Marbury substantially tracks the 
argument in Federalist No. 78, which suggests that the conclusion 
had already been widely accepted among those who ratified the 
Constitution. More generally, the ratification debates are replete 
with statements-by proponents and opponents of ratification 
alike-assuming that the new federal courts would have an 
obligation to invalidate unconstitutional statutes. 10 If everyone 
assumed that judicial review was an inherent part of the "judicial 
Power" conferred on federal judges by Article III, it did not 
need to be spelled out in the constitutional text, and the power 
did not need to be seized or invented by the Court in Marbury. 
Accordingly, scholars have looked for the origin of judicial 
review in pre-Marbury case law. They have found a few tentative 
stirrings in colonial and early state and federal court decisions 
and perhaps at least a desire for such authority in Coke's famous 
report of Dr. Bonham's Case. 11 Although the evidence will not 
support the notion that Marbury illegitimately, or even 
dubiously, established judicial review, American judges may still 
seem as a practical matter to have created the power of judicial 
review for themselves-partly from the implicit logic of written 
constitutions, partly from institutional and personal self interest, 
and partly from a vision of its potentially salutary political 
effects. 
In this account, the Supreme Court might have refrained 
from asserting the power of judicial review, and it is in any event 
Marshall and his successors who have determined the scope and 
purposes of this power. Accordingly, the continuing beneficence 
of their achievement depends largely on ensuring that the 
courts-and above all the United States Supreme Court-are 
staffed with people who have the political and moral wisdom to 
exercise this power appropriately. Hence Barack Obama's 
10. Some of the delegates at Philadelphia doubted that courts should have the 
authority to declare statutes void, but nobody seems to have doubted that they would 
have that authority unless the Constitution expressly denied it to them. (pp. 602-03). It is 
possible that the existence of this authority may have been denied by some men during 
the ratification debates. but I do not recall seeing such a claim by any of the major 
participants. 
11. 77 Eng. Rep. 638. 646 (1610). Hamburger argues that Coke's allusion to the 
notion that acts of Parliament could be held void has been widely misunderstood. (pp. 
622-30). 
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emphasis on "one's deepest values, one's core concerns, one's 
broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and 
breadth of one's empathy.'' 
III. JUDICIAL DUTY 
Law and Judicial Duty argues that all of the subtle variants 
of this story in the scholarly literature are wrong. Hamburger has 
a simple and counter-conventional thesis, which he supports with 
elaborate argument and documentation: judicial review has been 
with us for centuries, in the form of an unvarying duty to follow 
the law rather than to follow one's heart. According to 
Hamburger, the very term ''judicial review" is misleading. For 
many centuries. English and American judges had a duty to 
decide cases in accord with the law of the land.12 This was a duty 
of all judges. from the highest to the lowest. And it applied in all 
cases, not just those in which the legality of a government action, 
or the constitutionality of a statute. was at issue. The term 
''judicial review" is also misleading because it suggests a power 
or discretion that might be broader than the duty to follow the 
law. 
This understanding of judicial duty was certainly not the 
one articulated by Barack Obama. but neither was it the 
simplistic straw man lampooned by Professor Seidman and many 
others today. Judges' belief that their duty gave them no choice 
but to follow the law of the land did not mean that it was always 
easy to know what the law required. Nor did it mean that judges 
would never be tempted to recur to their own moral and political 
beliefs when the law was uncertain or when its dictates were 
disagreeable or seemingly unjust. Nevertheless, Hamburger 
argues that the central achievement of English judges was the 
development of an intellectual and moral discipline through 
which fallible human beings could resist these temptations, and 
strive with considerable success to purge judicial decisions of the 
influence of individual will. 
None of us could think they always succeeded, and neither 
did they. But however often they may have failed, due to human 
weakness. there was no recognized exception from this judicial 
duty, even in what Obama called "those 5 percent of cases that 
are truly difficult." Nor were these judges unaware of theories 
12. The law of the land did not encompass subordinate laws. such as local customs. 
acts of municipal corporations. and colonial statutes. 
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resembling Obama's. At least as early as the fourteenth century, 
the common law approach to judicial duty faced a fundamental 
challenge from academically minded lawyers (especially those 
influenced by continental jurisprudence) who believed that 
judges had an obligation to follow natural or divine law when it 
conflicted with human law. 
Without denying that natural and divine law had a higher 
authority than any human law, and without denying that English 
law was undoubtedly imperfect in many ways, English judges 
strongly resisted the conclusion that they ever had a right or duty 
to go against the law of the land while exercising their judicial 
office. Similarly, these judges denied that other external sources 
of law-such as civil, ecclesiastical, or international law, and 
even treaties -were obligatory in English courts unless and until 
they were incorporated in the law of the land (as had been done 
in some areas, such as maritime law). 
Most of Law and Judicial Duty is devoted to tracing the 
persistence of this narrow but profoundly difficult and 
demanding ideal of judicial duty through English and American 
history up to the end of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the most 
striking feature of Hamburger's lucid and thoughtful account is 
how durable this understanding of the judicial office proved to 
be in the face of momentous political, religious, and social 
upheavals. Judicial understandings of the law of the land did of 
course change considerably over the centuries. The judges, 
however, were generally very disciplined in accommodating 
social change, preferring to act only indirectly, in small steps, 
and with the goal of discerning rather than creating the law. 
Notably, they were very resistant to intellectuals "whose 
experience with the rigidities of the common law made them 
eager for approaches that 'le[ft) the wit of man more free to 
turne and tosse."' 11 (p. 117, quoting Francis Bacon). 
Whatever else one may think of Sotomayor's Senate 
testimony, the understanding of judicial duty she professed came 
from people who were not airheads or legal nai"fs. 
13. This restless intellectual spirit may be seen as a variant of the academic natural 
law approach. just as the pragmatism of modern academic judges like Richard Posner 
may be seen as a variant within the modern higher-law tradition. 
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IV. JUDICIAL DUTY AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS 
To all this, one might still object that it fails to account for 
the profound change that occurred when Americans adopted 
their written constitutions. Judicial review of the Marbury sort is 
a decision by a court to invalidate a statute adopted by a 
coordinate legislature. Acts of Parliament were never 
invalidated by the courts on constitutional grounds, and 
probably never could have been under English legal theory. 
Even if one wants to call the American practice of judicial 
review just another instance of "applying the law to the facts," 
isn't this a unique exercise of judicial power that requires a 
distinct understanding of its effects and rationale? The evidence 
in Law and Judicial Duty suggests two different answers to this 
question: no and maybe. 
Contrary to a widespread misconception, Hamburger 
argues, English courts did not refrain from invalidating acts of 
Parliament because of that body's sovereignty. Rather, its 
statutes were immune from judicial invalidation primarily 
because Parliament served not only as a legislature but also as 
the highest court of the realm. As such, it had the authority to 
discern and declare the common law and the constitution, which 
was an element of the common law. Accordingly, it would have 
been absurd for subordinate courts to declare its acts 
unconstitutional, just as it would be absurd for our inferior 
federal courts to overrule the Supreme Court. That did not 
imply that Parliament was the creator of the English 
constitution, any more than our Supreme Court need be 
understood as the creator of our Constitution. Although there 
may have been no legal appeal from Parliament on 
constitutional questions, that was because of Parliament's 
judicial role, just as there is no legal appeal from constitutional 
decisions of our Supreme Court. 14 
This analysis is confirmed, according to Hamburger, by the 
fact that English courts did invalidate sovereign acts of the 
14. Parliament also had the legislative authority to change the common law through 
statutes. and this might effectively have entailed a power to change England's customary 
constitution. If so. however. it was not for this reason that ordinary courts were unable to 
declare acts of Parliament unconstitutional. but rather on account of Parliament's status 
as the highest court of the realm. (pp. 237-42) It did not escape notice that this 
arrangement threatened to leave Parliament with the power to alter the constitution 
without the consent of the people. As we are frequently reminded. this kind of problem 
did not disappear when Americans adopted written constitutions that separated the 
judiciary from the legislature. 
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Crown that were contrary to the law of the land. 10 The difference 
between the Crown and Parliament was not that only one of 
them was sovereign, or that only one of them could bring severe 
political pressure to bear on the judges, but rather that only one 
of them was the highest court in the land. Accordingly, when 
American constitutions separated the highest judicial court from 
the legislature, no alteration of the traditional understanding of 
judicial duty was required. American judges could declare 
statutes unconstitutional for the same reason that English courts 
had long had a duty to declare acts of the Crown 
unconstitutional. 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, some of the evidence in 
Law and Judicial Duty suggests that the seeds of our modern 
understanding of judicial review may already have germinated 
during the founding period, and in a surprising place. Had I been 
asked where to look for such seeds before I read this book, I 
might have pointed to Calder v. Bul/,16 thinking that dicta in 
Justice Chase's opinion shows that the academically oriented 
natural law approach to judging had not been decisively 
repudiated in our legal tradition. That approach, of course, 
eventually became controversial within the Supreme Court, and 
at some point the "living constitution" version of the higher law 
approach to judging became the dominant understanding of 
American constitutional law among people with legal training. 
Hamburger argues that I would have been wrong. The 
common law had always recognized a distinction between the 
law of the land, always strictly binding on the courts, and local 
customs, whose legal validity was adjudicated under a test of 
reasonableness. At the time of Calder, Connecticut had not yet 
adopted a written constitution and was still governed by 
customary law. Hamburger believes that Chase's controversial 
claim- that "certain vital principles in our free Republican 
governments" may be invoked by courts to overrule an 
"apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power" -applied 
15. Judges also declined to assist parliamentary efforts to invade the constitutional 
authority of the Crown. and refused to enforce unconstitutional acts of a single house of 
Parliament (pp. 215. 249). 
16. 3 U.S. (3 Daii.) 386 (1798). After a Connecticut probate court disapproved a 
will. the legislature ordered a rehearing by that same court. On rehearing. the court 
approved the will. and that decision was affirmed by the state appeiiate courts. The 
United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. holding that the Connecticut 
legislature had not violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I. § 10. The Court also 
declined to hold that the Connecticut legislature had unconstitutionaily exercised a 
power that it did not possess. 
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only to laws adopted under local custom. Accordingly, Chase did 
not mean that the United States Constitution imposed such 
constraints on Connecticut or that higher law principles could 
ever be invoked by judges to override a statute validly enacted 
pursuant to a written constitution. In Hamburger's view, Justice 
Iredell objected to Chase's loosely worded dicta only from an 
abundance of caution, and merely reaffirmed the utterly 
conventional and traditional view that abstract principles of 
natural law or natural justice may never justify a court in 
departing from the law of the land.17 
Nevertheless, Hamburger does detect some founding era 
skepticism about the traditional view, and he finds it in a striking 
source. As every reader of the Federalist Papers has to be aware, 
a central purpose of our Constitution is to curb democratic 
excess and injustice. After the Philadelphia Convention, James 
Madison deeply regretted that Congress had not been given the 
power to veto state laws, a tool that he thought was probably 
indispensable for achieving this central purpose. 1" But it wasn't 
only the state governments that worried Madison. At 
Philadelphia, he and James Wilson persistently and forcefully 
pressed for the creation of a federal council of revision, whose 
function would have been to give the judiciary a share in the 
veto power, in order to help prevent Congress itself from 
enacting unconstitutional or unwise laws. The opposition to this 
proposal was equally forceful. Other delegates made the obvious 
and powerful points that involving judges in the creation of 
legislation would call for modes of thinking alien to the judicial 
office, and would inevitably tend to bias their legal judgment 
when those same laws came before them in their judicial 
capacity. 
Characteristically, Madison acknowledged the merit in his 
opponents' points. He nonetheless insisted, and insisted strongly, 
that the disadvantages they noted were outweighed by the 
advantages, especially the utility of employing the "wisdom and 
weight" of the judges to strengthen the executive's ability to 
resist improper legislation. Nor was Madison's proposal a radical 
innovation. English courts had only stopped issuing advisory 
17. I must confess that I am not fully persuaded by Hamburger's interpretation of 
Chase's dicta. even after re-reading the opinions in Calder v. Bull. If Chase meant only 
what Hamburger thinks he meant. the wording of his dicta was very loose indeed. 
18. Madison did not believe that judicial power alone would even be able to keep 
the state governments within constitutional bounds (p. 595 n.l6. quoting Letter from 
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson. Oct. 24. 1787). 
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opmwns in 1760, and English judges had continued to give 
advice on legislation in the House of Lords. Some American 
states, moreover, had adopted councils of revision similar to 
what Madison and Wilson were proposing. 
Madison's proposal must nonetheless have reflected one of 
two questionable judgments. Perhaps he was confident that the 
difficult self discipline required by the traditional understanding 
of judicial duty could survive the immersion of judges in the 
legislative process. Or perhaps he was willing to risk the loss of 
this self discipline for the sake of establishing a strong 
institutional counterweight to Congress. Hamburger appears to 
lean toward the second alternative. and so do I. If we're right, 
Madison certainly got what he wanted, even without a council of 
revision. But his opponents also turned out to be right, at least 
insofar as they feared that the nature of the judicial office would 
be radically transformed once judges became part-time 
legislators (as they often now are, if only in ''those 5 percent of 
cases that are truly difficult"). 
Madison himself recognized that his balance-of-powers 
approach would require some kind of new checks on the 
judiciary in order to avoid the kind of judicial supremacy that 
the Court eventually proclaimed for itself in Cooper v. Aaron. 19 
But what would those checks be? Hamburger thinks Madison 
had no answer. Accordingly, he does not attribute much 
significance to Madison's position, arguing that it was neither 
fully thought out nor widely accepted. For a more reliable 
exposition of the prevailing understanding, Hamburger turns to 
Alexander Hamilton's essay in Federalist No. 78. 
Hamilton argued that judges would be obliged to refuse 
enforcement to unconstitutional laws, and that Acts of Congress 
could not be excepted from this rule. Having only judgment, not 
will, judges would be much less likely than members of Congress 
to substitute their own preferences for the will of the sovereign 
people as it is expressed in the Constitution. Granting that 
judges, too, could depart from their duty, Hamilton argued that 
this risk was inseparable from the decision to separate the 
19. 358 U.S. I. 18 (1958). After noting that American constitutions by their terms 
made no provision for resolving disagreements among the independent departments of 
government. Madison added that .. as the Courts are generally the last in making their 
decision. it results to them. by refusing or not refusing to execute a law. to stamp it with 
its final character. This makes the Judiciary Dept paramount in fact to the Legislature. 
which was never intended. and can never be proper .. (p. 551 & n.24. quoting 
"Observations on the ·Draught of a Constitution for Virginia ... (Oct. 15. 1788) ). 
180 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:169 
judiciary from the legislature. The threat of impeachment, 
moreover, would keep such behavior from going too far. 
Hamburger must be right that Federalist No. 78 is strong 
evidence that the new Constitution was not meant to alter the 
age-old office (i.e. duty) of the judge. What we call judicial 
review was a necessary consequence of that understanding of the 
office, but it was not one that required judges to become 
philosopher- or economist-kings, calculating practitioners of 
interest-group politics, or moral shepherds of the people. 
One wonders, though, whether Hamilton completely 
revealed his own thoughts in Federalist No. 78. 20 In the course of 
his reassuring argument that the judiciary is "incontestably" the 
weakest and least dangerous of the three departments of 
government, Hamilton quotes Montesquieu: "Of the three 
powers above mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing. "21 
This quotation is extremely misleading. As its context in The 
Spirit of the Laws makes unmistakably clear, Montesquieu is 
referring to English juries, not to the government officials we call 
judges. In fact, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of 
Montesquieu's analysis of the English constitution is the absence 
of any discussion of the kind of judges Hamilton is discussing in 
Federalist No. 78. Montesquieu's omission, moreover, was surely 
deliberate. 
As we know from Federalist No. 9, Hamilton was a very 
careful reader of The Spirit of the Laws, and it seems quite 
unlikely that he was unaware that he was mis-citing 
Montesquieu. Perhaps Montesquieu and Hamilton were 
persuaded that a modern republic requires independent judges 
to play a significant political role in maintaining the 
constitutional balance. Perhaps Montesquieu and Hamilton were 
also persuaded that this role requires judges to go well beyond 
"applying the law to the facts." And perhaps they believed that 
judges and responsible proponents of judicial independence are 
20. Hamburger recognizes that Hamilton's comments about equitable 
interpretation in Federalist No. 78 may have encouraged the development of a newly 
expansive understanding of the judicial role (pp. 355-57). 
21. Hamilton appears to be citing and quoting from an English translation of The 
Spirit of the Laws. which was published in 1773 in London by Crowder. Ware and Payne. 
and that same year in Edinburgh by Kincaid and Creech. Hamilton's quotation is 
inaccurate, for it omits the words I have italicized in the sentence as it appears in the 1773 
translation: "Of the three powers above mentioned. the judiciary is in some measure next 
to nothing." 
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also required to conceal or at least obscure the extent of their 
political activity. 22 
If that is so, perhaps the distance between Madison and 
Hamilton is less than it first appears to be. That, of course, 
would not resolve our contemporary debates about the Supreme 
Court's appropriate role, or tell us what kind of people should be 
appointed to it. It certainly doesn't imply the propriety of the 
kind of selective exercise of will endorsed by Barack Obama,23 
let alo~e the ,perva~ive ~ctivism that Professor Seidman thinks is 
unavmdable.- It mtght mstead prompt us to wonder whether the 
framers and proponents of the new Constitution gave sufficient 
thought to the dangers posed by a powerful and independent 
judiciary.2' Hamburger's book raises such questions, and 
pursuing them in a dispassionate way would help keep academic 
discussions of the subject from resembling the burlesques so 
frequently performed by Senators and judicial nominees. 
22. For further detail. see PAUL 0. CARRESE. THE CLOAKING OF POWER: 
MONTESQUIEU. BLACKSTONE. AND THE RISE OF Jt.:DICIAL ACTIVISM (2003): Nelson 
Lund. Montesquieu. Judicial Degeneracy and the United States Supreme Court. in 
NATURAL MORAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY. Holger Zaborowski ed. (Catholic 
U. of Amer. Press. forthcoming). available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id= 1344487. 
23. In his speech opposing John Roberts' confirmation as Chief Justice. Obama 
said: 
In those 5 percent of hard cases. the constitutional text will not be directly on 
point. The language of the statute will not be perfectly clear. Legal process 
alone will not lead you to a rule of decision. In those circumstances. vour 
decisions about wheiher affirmative action is an appropriate response to the 
history of discrimination in this country or whether a general right of privacy 
encompasses a more specific right of women to control their reproductive 
decisions or whether the commerce clause empowers Congress to speak on 
those issues of broad national concern that may be only tangentially related to 
what is easily defined as interstate commerce. whether a person who is disabled 
has the right to be accommodated so they can work alongside those who are 
nondisabled- in those difficult cases. the critical ingredient is supplied by what 
is in the judge's heart. 
Senator Barack Obama. Confirmation of Judge John Roberts (Sept. 22. 2005). available 
at http:/ /obamaspeeches.com/031-C onfirmation -of-Judge-John-Roberts-Obama -Speech. 
htm. 
24. The Federalist Society Online Debate Series. July 19. 2009. http://www.fed-
soc.org/debates/dbtid.30/default.asp ("[M]any areas of the law are open textured and 
indeterminate- [and] the legal material frequently (actually, I would sa\' always) must be 
supplemented by contestable presuppositions. empirical assumptions. and moral 
judgments.") (emphasis added). 
25. Perhaps it is too late even to think about moving our Supreme Court back 
toward the model described by Hamilton and Hamburger. But perhaps it is not 
inherently impossible. For some suggestions about steps that Congress might consider 
taking. see Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund. Judicial Dun· and the Supreme Court's Cult 
of Celebrity. GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Judgments about Law and Judicial Duty as a work of 
historical scholarship will have to be made by those who are far 
more familiar with the sources than I could ever pretend to be. 
But I can say at least this much to anyone who wants to talk 
about the origins and nature of American judicial review, or 
about the duty of judges in our legal system: If you don't first 
become intimately familiar with this book, you run a big risk of 
looking like an ignoramus or a fool. 
